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This study explored spatial navigation alongside several other cognitive abilities that are
thought to share common underlying neurocognitive mechanisms (e.g., the capacity for
self-projection, scene construction, or mental simulation), and which we hypothesized
may be impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Twenty intellectually high-functioning
children with ASD (with a mean age of ∼8 years) were compared to 20 sex, age, IQ, and
language ability matched typically developing children on a series of tasks to assess spatial
navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking (also known as episodic foresight
or prospection), theory of mind (ToM), relational memory, and central coherence. This
is the first study to explore these abilities concurrently within the same sample. Spatial
navigation was assessed using the “memory island” task, which involves finding objects
within a realistic, computer simulated, three-dimensional environment. Episodic memory
and episodic future thinking were assessed using a past and future event description task.
ToM was assessed using the “animations” task, in which children were asked to describe
the interactions between two animated triangles. Relational memory was assessed using
a recognition task involving memory for items (line drawings), patterned backgrounds,
or combinations of items and backgrounds. Central coherence was assessed by exploring
differences in performance across segmented and unsegmented versions of block design.
Children with ASD were found to show impairments in spatial navigation, episodic
memory, episodic future thinking, and central coherence, but not ToM or relational
memory. Among children with ASD, spatial navigation was found to be significantly
negatively related to the number of repetitive behaviors. In other words, children who
showed more repetitive behaviors showed poorer spatial navigation. The theoretical and
practical implications of the results are discussed.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, episodic future thinking, episodic memory, mental simulation, scene
construction, self-projection, spatial navigation, theory of mind
INTRODUCTION
It has been proposed that a common, core network of brain
regions (within the medial temporal lobe, precuneus, posterior
cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, temporal-parietal junc-
tion, lateral prefrontal cortex, and occipital cortex) underlies
several high-level cognitive abilities including (a) certain types
of spatial navigation, (b) remembering past events (episodic
memory), (c) imagining future events (episodic future think-
ing/foresight/prospection), and (d) theory of mind (ToM) (e.g.,
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Spreng
et al., 2009). At the cognitive level, Buckner and Carroll sug-
gest that each of these functions involve “self-projection”—the
ability to mentally simulate alternative perspectives. Alternatively,
Hassabis and Maguire argue that the common underlying process
(with the exception of ToM) is “scene construction”—the abil-
ity to generate and maintain a complex and coherent scene or
event through binding the various (possibly multimodal) ele-
ments of a scene into a coherent whole (cf. Baddeley, 2000,
2002). The notions of self-projection and scene construction,
which originate primarily from the field of neuroscience, closely
echo the longer-standing notion of “mental simulation.” From
this perspective, Shanton and Goldman (2010) have suggested
that whereas ToM involves inter-personal simulation, episodic
remembering and episodic future thinking involve intra-personal
simulation (also see Schacter et al., 2008), and others have
highlighted the importance of mental simulation in spatial nav-
igation (e.g., Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982; Chersi et al.,
2013).
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Spatial navigation—or the ability to find one’s way around
an environment—can be supported by external representa-
tions, such as physical maps, or by internal, mental repre-
sentations, generated from memory (Wolbers and Hegarty,
2010). The latter is known as “memory-guided” navigation.
Researchers have identified several memory-guided navigation
strategies, including “route-based” and “survey-based” strate-
gies (Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982). Route-based navigation
relies on incrementally learned, inflexible, egocentric (person-
centered) representations of specific sequences of landmarks,
junctions, left/right turns etc. On the other hand, survey-based
navigation relies on flexible, allocentric (world-centered) repre-
sentations, or “cognitive maps” (Tolman, 1948), of the spatial
layout of the environment. Survey-based navigation is the spe-
cific form of navigation that is hypothesized to involve scene
construction/self-projection/mental simulation.
The scene construction and self-projection theories rely heav-
ily on support from neuroimaging studies of typically developing
adults that suggest common brain regions are implicated dur-
ing spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking,
and ToM tasks (e.g., Spreng et al., 2009). In terms of cognitive
developmental studies of children, as far as we are aware, none
have explored all four of these abilities in the same sample, and
none appear to have explored relations between spatial naviga-
tion and any of the other three abilities. However, there is some
evidence for developmental associations between episodic mem-
ory and episodic future thinking (e.g., Quon and Atance, 2010),
and episodic memory and ToM (e.g., Perner et al., 2007), but not
episodic future thinking and ToM (Hanson et al., 2014). If each
of these abilities does rely on a common underlying cognitive
process, their development would necessarily be constrained by
development in that underlying process. In that case, one might
predict that each ability should develop in parallel, at a similar
rate. (Consistent with this analysis, episodic memory, episodic
future thinking, and ToM all appear to undergo some signifi-
cant developments at around the age of 4 years). On the other
hand, this may not turn out to be the case, given that they also
each involve their own unique cognitive processes (e.g., successful
spatial navigation may also involve planning a route, in addition
to generating a cognitive map of the environment), which may
develop at different rates.
The scene construction, self-projection, and mental simula-
tion theories are interesting and important theoretical proposals
in their own right, but they may also be relevant to our under-
standing of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a condition charac-
terized by impairments in social communication and behavioral
flexibility (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). People with
ASD are often considered to have difficulties with “imagina-
tion” (e.g., Ten Eycke and Müller, 2014) but this is a rather
broad, and often ill-defined concept (variously encompassing
the notions of creativity, generativity, visual imagery, and/or the
capacity for pretense). More specifically, we have hypothesized
that ASD involves core impairments in scene construction and
self-projection, which may underpin (or at least contribute to) a
range of impairments in high-level cognitive processes that seem
to involve some form of mental simulation (Lind et al., 2013,
2014). Along similar lines, Oberman and Ramachandran (2007)
have suggested that individuals with ASD may have difficulties
with mirror-neuron-based social simulation (i.e., inter-personal
simulation, in Shanton and Goldman’s, 2010, terms). However,
this proposal is narrower in scope than our own, and only relates
to ToM—not spatial navigation, episodic memory, or episodic
future thinking.
The hypothesis that ASD involves core impairments in scene
construction/self-projection/mental simulation is yet to be fully
empirically tested, but several existing research findings are con-
sistent with it. Previous studies of spatial navigation in ASD
have reported mixed results and have suffered from problems
such as inadequate ASD/comparison group matching on perfor-
mance IQ (Prior and Hoffman, 1990; Fornasari et al., 2013) or sex
(Edgin and Pennington, 2005), or incomplete reporting of results
(Caron et al., 2004), making interpretation of findings inconclu-
sive (see Lind et al., 2013, for a detailed evaluation). However,
in a recent study, we found that intellectually high-functioning
adults with ASD were moderately and significantly impaired in
spatial navigation, relative to sex, age, and IQ matched neurotyp-
ical, comparison adults (Lind et al., 2013). Participants completed
the “memory island” spatial navigation task (Rizk-Jackson et al.,
2006; Piper et al., 2010), which involved asking them to find their
way around a computer-simulated, island environment using a
joystick, and to locate a series of target objects on the island.
During an initial training (or “visible”) phase, the locations of
the object were indicated by large, easily visible flags. This phase
provided an opportunity to construct a cognitive map of the envi-
ronment, to learn the locations of the target objects, and to learn
the task. This phase did not require memory-guided navigation
and could be completed using a “locomotor guidance” strategy—
an online process that allows one to travel to a visible beacon
(such as a flag) kept in constant view (Foo et al., 2005). Hence,
performance during this phase indexed participants’ ability to
manage non-central task demands, such as comprehension of task
instructions and proficiency with the joystick. This phase was
immediately followed by the test (or “hidden”) phase in which
participants had to locate the target objects without the aid of the
flag markers. Here, participants had to rely solely on their cogni-
tive map of the environment and their memory for the location
of the target object (see Lind et al., 2013 for further explanation).
It was found that participants with ASD had no difficulty locating
the objects during the “visible” phase of the task, but had con-
siderable difficulty with doing so during the “hidden” phase, as
reflected by a tendency to search for the objects in the wrong areas
of the island and to take longer, less efficient, routes. This sug-
gests a specific difficulty with generating a cognitive map from a
ground-based perspective.
Recently, Maras et al. (2014) explored the ability of intellec-
tually high-functioning adults with ASD to recreate and scan
a previously seen physical map of an island in their mental
imagery. Performance of participants with ASD was very simi-
lar to that of closely matched comparison participants, suggesting
that they preserved the spatial properties of the map in their
mental images. This suggests that people with ASD are able to
hold cognitive maps in mind, if the topographical layout of those
maps is initially provided for them in a concrete visual form.
Thus, difficulties with spatial navigation, as manifested in the
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Lind et al. (2013) study, appear to originate in actually gener-
ating cognitive maps themselves from their own ground-based
memories of the layout of an environment. Such an interpre-
tation is consistent with the idea that scene construction/self-
projection/simulation is impaired among individuals with the
disorder.
In addition to difficulties with navigation, we have also found
that adults with ASD have impaired episodic memory, episodic
future thinking, ability to imagine fictitious scenes, and ToM
(Lind and Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014; but see Crane et al.,
2013). This research (as well as other research that has demon-
strated impaired episodic memory and ToM in adults with ASD:
e.g., Happé, 1994; Bowler et al., 2000) is consistent with the
idea that self-projection/scene construction/mental simulation is
impaired in adults with ASD.
However, less is known about these abilities in children with the
disorder (with the exception of ToM, which has been explored in
countless studies and is consistently found to be delayed in chil-
dren with ASD; e.g., Yirmiya et al., 1998). As explained above,
studies of spatial navigation in children with ASD do not pro-
vide clear evidence either for or against the idea that this ability
is impaired. The limited existing evidence on episodic memory
suggests that this does appear to be impaired in children with
ASD (e.g., Lind and Bowler, 2009). Only one previous study
has explored both episodic memory and episodic future thinking
among children with ASD. Jackson and Atance (2008) and Terrett
et al. (2013) conducted a pilot study of episodic future thinking
but not episodic memory in children with ASD, but inadequate
ASD/comparison group matching makes it difficult to interpret
the results definitively. Terrett et al. asked children with ASD as
well as sex-, age-, and IQ-matched typically developing children
to complete the Adapted Autobiographical Memory Interview.
This involved asking them to respond to cue words (e.g., “friend”
or “naughty”) by providing verbal descriptions of past events that
they had previously experienced and future events they were likely
to experience. Consistent with the proposal that episodic mem-
ory and episodic future thinking are impaired in ASD, children
with ASD were indeed found to produce fewer details overall.
But, given the particular type of coding used in the study, as the
authors themselves acknowledge, these between group differences
could potentially have been explained by differences in narrative
skills, which were not assessed as part of the study. Moreover,
because Terrett et al. did not verify response accuracy, it is diffi-
culty to be sure whether the participants’ descriptions were based
on accurate memory for the past or likely accurate episodic future
thinking of the future.
Thus, although there is some preliminary evidence, it is cur-
rently unclear whether the difficulties with navigation, episodic
memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM observed in adults
with ASD are the later emergent outcome of widespread, interde-
pendent atypical cognitive development and behavior, or whether
such difficulties originate and are reliably evident in childhood. If
already present in childhood, this may imply that difficulties with
scene construction/self-projection/mental simulation are causally
significant in the ASD cognitive profile (see Lind et al., 2013, for
further discussion). For this reason, it is important to explore
these abilities in children.
We are not aware of any research that has explored spatial nav-
igation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM in
the same sample of children with ASD (or indeed any typically
developing sample). The current study aimed to establish whether
these abilities are concurrently impaired in ASD, and whether
they are interrelated. If our hypothesis is correct and ASD involves
core impairments in the capacity for scene construction/self-
projection/mental simulation, we would expect to see significant
impairments in spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic
future thinking, and ToM among children with ASD. We may
also see (a) negative relations between each of these abilities
and quantitative measures of ASD features, and (b) positive rela-
tions among spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic future
thinking, and ToM.
For the current study, children with and without ASD were
asked to complete a battery of experimental tasks, including the
memory island spatial navigation task, which we have previously
employed with adults with ASD (Lind et al., 2013), as explained
above; an event description task designed to assess episodic mem-
ory and episodic future thinking (based on Quon and Atance,
2010); and a version of the ToM animations task (Abell et al.,
2000). With respect to the memory island task, given that only
the “hidden” phase of the task requires genuine memory-guided
navigation, involving the generation of a cognitive map (and, we
hypothesize, scene construction/self-projection/mental stimula-
tion), we expected to see ASD-specific difficulties in the hidden
condition specifically.
The event description task was modeled on a task developed by
Quon and Atance (2010). It involved asking participants to pro-
vide short verbal descriptions of particular events. Across three
conditions, we assessed (a) autobiographical episodic memory,
(b) autobiographical episodic future thinking, and (c) autobio-
graphical semantic event knowledge. We predicted that children
with ASD would perform less well across all three conditions
but particularly so with respect to episodic memory and episodic
future thinking. We did not predict intact performance in the
semantic event knowledge condition (even though this should
not involve scene construction/self-projection/mental stimula-
tion) because previous research has shown autobiographical
semantic memory and event schema knowledge to be impaired in
children with ASD (Bruck et al., 2007; Loth et al., 2008), a deficit
which may be related to broader impairments in self-awareness
(Lind, 2010).
In order to assess ToM, we opted to use a version of the
widely used (see White et al., 2011, for a review) “animations”
task (Abell et al., 2000) because unlike many standard measures
of ToM (e.g., false belief tasks), it is sensitive to ToM impair-
ments among intellectually high-functioning individuals with
ASD (e.g., Williams et al., 2013), and variation in ToM skills
among typically developing children. The task requires partici-
pants to describe interactions between two triangles, as portrayed
in a series of silent, animated video clips. We employed both a
“metalizing” condition, comprising clips that were intended to
evoke descriptions involving the attribution of mental states, such
as belief, intention, and deception, as well as a “goal-directed”
condition, comprising clips that were intended to evoke descrip-
tions involving the attribution of physical agency and intentional
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action. Although both conditions are thought to involve ToM
to some extent, the metalizing condition is thought to involve
“higher-level” aspects of ToM. On the basis of abundant previ-
ous research and the hypothesis that self-projection or mental
simulation is required for ToM (self-projection/mental simula-
tion should allow one to “put oneself in the triangles’ shoes”—i.e.,
take their perspective—to attribute mental states to them), we
predicted that children with ASD would perform less well than
typically developing children in both conditions.
In addition to the main experimental tasks referred to above,
we also included measures of “central coherence” and “relational
memory.” It is well established that people with ASD frequently
show a detail-focused perceptual/cognitive style—termed “weak
central coherence” by some researchers (e.g., Happé and Frith,
2006)—which can make it difficult for them to “see the forest for
the trees.” It seems plausible that weak central coherence could
be related to difficulties with scene construction in ASD (given
that scene construction involves generating mental representa-
tions that involve binding together multiple, rich details which
form a coherent scene), and may therefore be related to con-
comitant difficulties with spatial navigation, episodic memory,
and episodic future thinking. Following Shah and Frith (1993),
we obtained a measure of central coherence by asking partici-
pants to complete two versions of the block design subtest of the
Wechsler intelligence scales. In this test, participants must recreate
2D geometric patterns using 3D colored blocks. Shah and Frith
argued that people with ASD tend to perceive these patterns in
a piecemeal fashion; hence the constituent parts are obvious to
them. By contrast, typically developing individuals tend to see
the whole design and do not automatically see the constituent
parts. These researchers reasoned that by separating out the target
patterns into their component parts—corresponding to individ-
ual blocks—the performance of typical individuals should be
improved. On the other hand, people with ASD should not ben-
efit from this manipulation because they already see the design
in a piecemeal way. Indeed, this is what Shah and Frith found
(and interpreted as evidence of weak central coherence in ASD).
Thus, in the current study we asked participants to complete seg-
mented and unsegmented versions of block design and obtained
a difference score to provide an index of central coherence.
Our expectation was that typically developing children should
show greater central coherence (i.e., the segmentation manip-
ulation should improve their performance more) than children
with ASD.
We were also interested in exploring relational memory or
memory “binding” —i.e., the ability to encode in and retrieve
from memory the associations between features (Chalfonte and
Johnson, 1996)—given that previous research has suggested this
may be impaired in adults with ASD (Bowler et al., 2014), and that
it is likely to be a pre-requisite for scene construction, given that it
is multi-featural by nature. Relational memory was assessed using
a recognition memory task (based on Lloyd et al., 2009) in which
the to-be-remembered items were isolated items (line drawings),
isolated (patterned) backgrounds, or combinations of items and
backgrounds. We predicted that children with ASD would show
significantly diminished recognition memory for combinations of
items and backgrounds (which relies on relational memory) but
intact memory for individual items (given that previous research
indicates that item recognition is generally intact in ASD; see
Boucher et al., 2012, for a review).
Previously, we have speculated that difficulties with episodic
future thinking (Lind and Bowler, 2010) and navigation (Lind
et al., 2013) may be connected with the behavioral inflexibility
that characterizes ASD. For example, we questioned whether dif-
ficulties with flexibly imagining possible future situations could
contribute to over-reliance on rigid routines, and whether dif-
ficulties with survey-based spatial navigation might result in
overreliance on inflexible, route-based navigation and insis-
tence on following well learned routes among some individuals.
Alternatively, behavioral inflexibility might actually play a causal
role in the atypical development of episodic future thinking and
or/navigation. Either way, it is important to establish whether
there is any empirical relation between these variables as we aimed
to do in the current study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty intellectually high-functioning children with ASD and 20
typically developing comparison children participated, after they
and their parents had given written, informed consent to take
part. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham
University Psychology Research Ethics Committee. Participants
received gift vouchers (worth £15) to thank them for their time.
Participants with ASD were recruited via (a) the Database of
Children with ASD Living in the North East of England, (b)
local primary schools, (c) an advert in an email newsletter to
staff at Durham University, and (d) word of mouth. Comparison
participants were recruited through local primary schools.
Inclusion criteria included having a full-scale IQ = 80,
being aged 6–12 years, and having no neurological or psychi-
atric disorders, other than ASD. Participants in the ASD group
had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 15)
or Asperger’s disorder (n = 5), according to DSM-IV criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). All documented diag-
nostic information was checked thoroughly by the researchers
and provided sufficient information to ensure diagnostic criteria
were met in each case.
Although it is becoming increasingly common to use the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G;
Lord et al., 2000) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised
(ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994) to “confirm” ASD diagnoses for
research purposes, we decided not use these instruments in the
present study for several reasons. Firstly, they have surprisingly
low specificity (i.e., rate of detecting true negatives). In the
largest study of its kind (N = 1039, compared to N = 381 and
N = 50 in the initial ADOS-G and ADI-R validation studies,
respectively), Risi et al. (2006) found that although the sensi-
tivity (i.e., rate of detecting true positives) of the ASD criteria
on the ADOS-G and the autism criteria on the ADI-R (the
ADI-R does not have separate ASD criteria) was reasonably
high across several independent samples (ADOS-G: 72.4–96.9;
ADI-R: 82.7–95.1%), the specificity was sometimes extremely
low (ADOS-G: 10.0–77.9%; ADI-R: 40.9–72.8%). Hence, these
instruments classify large numbers of non-spectrum individuals
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(who have other disorders) as autistic. In our view, this is
unacceptably low specificity to allow diagnostic confirmation
for our own research purposes. Arguably, for the purpose of
cognitive-experimental research (such as the present study),
specificity is of critical importance because we need to be con-
fident that our ASD sample comprises genuine cases. Secondly,
there is often poor agreement between the instruments (e.g.,
Bishop and Norbury, 2002; Ventola et al., 2006). Hence, using
ADOS-G ASD criteria and/or ADI-R autism criteria for selecting
research participants is problematic. We take the view that expert
clinical judgment (i.e., formal diagnosis) is a far more valid and
reliable criterion for inclusion in research such as this.
We agree with Bishop (2011); Bishop (May 30) that the
ADOS-G and ADI-R are “not optimal for diagnosing ASD for
research purposes,” and that “assessments such as the...Social
Responsiveness Scale, which treat autistic features as dimensions
rather than all-or-none symptoms, seem better suited to this
task than the existing gold standards.” Hence, to assess current
ASD features among children with ASD and the presence of
ASD-like features among comparison children for the current
study, participants’ parents/carers were asked to complete the
Social Responsiveness Scale, Second Edition (SRS-2, Constantino
and Gruber, 2012). Scores on this 65-item questionnaire pro-
vide a valid and reliable quantitative indicator of ASD features.
The SRS-2 (using a raw score cut-off of ≥ 60) has high sen-
sitivity (93%) and specificity (91%) (Constantino and Gruber,
2012), and (unlike the ADI-R) is independent of IQ (Constantino
et al., 2003). In addition to the psychometric advantages of the
SRS over the ADOS-G and ADI-R, it also takes a fraction of
the time (∼15 min, as opposed to ∼1 and 3 h, respectively) to
administer, thereby minimizing the test burden on participants.
Only two participants with ASD missed the ASD cut-off (each
scoring 57 points). Data analyses were conducted including and
excluding these participants (groups remained matched on base-
line variables) and results were not substantively altered. Thus,
all 20 participants with ASD were retained in the final sam-
ple. All comparison participants scored below the ASD cut-off.
Thus, none showed any sign, according to parents or carers,
of manifesting significant ASD-like traits. To obtain a thorough
index of behavioral inflexibility, participants’ parents were also
asked to complete the 43-item Repetitive Behavior Scale—Revised
(RBS-R) questionnaire (Bodfish et al., 2000).
Using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999), the groups were matched closely for verbal and
non-verbal IQ. Using the Test for Reception of Grammar, Second
Edition (TROG-2, Bishop, 2003), the groups were matched for
structural language ability. The groups were also matched for sex,
χ2(1,N = 40) = 0.14, p = 0.71, φ = 0.06, and chronological age.
Importantly, all effect sizes (r values) associated with group dif-
ferences in baseline characteristics of sex, age, IQ, and linguistic
ability were negligible to small in magnitude, indicating close
matching. Participant characteristics and matching statistics are
presented in Table 1.
OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURES
Participants completed the task battery over two sessions in
the following order: WASI (including the unsegmented version
Table 1 | Participant characteristics (means, standard deviations, and
inferential statistics for between-group differences).
Characteristic ASD Comparison t p r
(n = 20) (n = 20)
Sex (male: female) 16: 4 15: 5
Age (years) 8.67 (1.37) 8.32 (0.91) 0.94 0.353 0.15
VIQ 104.05 (13.54) 107.15 (5.29) 0.95 0.350 0.15
PIQ 105.35 (18.05) 109.60 (14.22) 0.83 0.431 0.13
FSIQ 105.65 (16.34) 109.05 (8.68) 0.82 0.418 0.13
TROG-2a 90.40 (13.23) 93.50 (8.21) 0.89 0.380 0.13
SRS-2b 110.65 (33.67) 22.00 (12.57) 11.03 <0.001 0.88
RBS-Rc 34.30 (21.54) 1.40 (2.01) 6.80 <0.001 0.73
Note. VIQ, verbal IQ; PIQ, performance IQ; FSIQ, full scale IQ; TROG-2, Test
for Reception of Grammar – Version 2; SRS-2, Social Responsiveness Scale –
Second Edition; RBS-R, Repetitive Behavior Scale – Revised.
aStandard Score;
bRaw score;
c Overall score.
of block design), TROG-2, relational memory task, spatial
navigation task, event description task, ToM task, and segmented
block design.
MEMORY ISLAND SPATIAL NAVIGATION TASK
Materials and procedures
Participants were asked to navigate within a computer-simulated,
three-dimensional, island environment, measuring 347 × 287
meters (see Figure 1 for screenshots).
The task was presented on a laptop computer (Sony Vaio; 16.4
inch screen) and included not only a visual (full color) depiction
of the surroundings, including buildings and other landmarks,
but also accompanying “nature” sounds, such as birdsong and
moving water. Participants sat at a comfortable distance from the
screen (∼50 cm).
Participants could explore the virtual environment using a
Microsoft Sidewinder joystick, which allowed them to determine
their direction and speed of travel. At the outset of the task, partic-
ipants were presented with the following on-screen instructions,
which were also read aloud by the experimenter:
You will cruise on a virtual island. In each trial, you will start in
the same position, but you may be looking in a different direction.
Your mission is to find a mysterious object hidden somewhere on
the island. To do that you need to look closely at what’s on the
island. Try to make a map in your head of the island and where
the mysterious objects are located on the island. If you cannot find
the mysterious object within 2 min, an arrow will help guide you
to it. Once you have found it, you must stand next to it and wait
for the game to end.
Participants were then asked if they had any questions, to ensure
they fully understood the requirements of the task.
Visible condition
During the first phase of the task, participants completed four
“visible” trials. In this condition, target items were marked by
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FIGURE 1 | Screen shots from the Memory Island spatial navigation task.
(A,B) Show the same view as it appeared in the visible and hidden conditions
of the experiment, respectively; (C–F) show the target objects used during
the visible trials; (D) shows the target object used for the hidden trials.
(G) Shows an aerial view of part of the island (this is purely for illustrative
purposes—participants never saw the island from this perspective). Part of
this figure is reproduced from Lind et al. (2013), published by American
Psychological Association and reprinted with permission.
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large flags, which could be clearly seen from a considerable
distance. Across visible trials 1, 2, 3, and 4, the target objects were
a sculpture, seal, seagull, and fountain, respectively. Each target
was assigned a unique location. On a given trial, only one target
was visible. At the outset of each trial, participants were instructed
to locate the flag and move toward it to find the target object.
If they were unable to locate it within 2 min, an arrow appeared
to direct them to it. Once the object was found, the partici-
pant was required to stand next to it, and the word “Remember”
appeared on the screen, prompting them to try to memorize its
location.
Hidden condition
The visible phase was immediately followed by the hidden phase,
comprising four hidden trials. In this condition, no flag mark-
ers were present, and participants were required to find their way
to the same target object (sculpture) on each trial (the location
was identical to the visible trial). The repeated use of the same
target across hidden trials provided participants with continued
opportunity for learning (protecting against floor effects). The
target object was indicated to the participant, in the form of an
on-screen visual image, at the outset of each trial. As for visible
trials, if a participant was unable to locate the target object within
2 min, an arrow appeared to direct them to it.
For both visible and hidden trials, the starting location was
always the center of the island. The starting orientation was varied
across trials but these variations remained constant across par-
ticipants. In other words, participants started each trial facing
a different direction—a feature of the task, designed to elimi-
nate reliance on inflexible (egocentric), procedurally memorized
sequences of turns, or stimulus–response associations, rather
than (allocentric) topographical knowledge of the layout of an
environment. Target locations were kept constant for all partic-
ipants. The time taken to complete the task varied according
to how quickly participants completed each trial (10–15 min
for most participants). The experimenter remained present
throughout.
Dependent measures
Participants’ movements were recorded in time-stamped, coor-
dinate files. Several dependent variables were calculated for each
trial, including (a) proportion of time spent within the target
quadrant; (b) latency to reach the target (seconds); (c) propor-
tion of successful trials in which the target was located within
the 2 min trial time; (d) velocity (virtual units/second); (e) path
length (virtual units); and (f) cumulative distance to the target
(virtual units).
For purposes of analysis, the island was divided into four equal
quadrants (rather like a pie chart divided into quarters) as is
commonly done for target quadrant analysis in water maze-type
navigation tasks. If a participant has successfully learned the loca-
tion of the target object, he/she typically will spend more time
searching in the correct quadrant. Hence, a higher proportion of
time spent in the target quadrant indicates better performance and
a more efficient route. Latency to reach the target simply provides
a measure of how long it takes a participant to reach the tar-
get object. Proportion of successful trials provides the most basic
indicator of task performance. Successful trials were defined as
trials in which the target was located within 2 min (i.e., before the
arrow appeared on screen to direct the participant to the target
object). Velocity is not itself a measure of task success, but several
other dependent variables, depend to some extent on velocity.
These variables include proportion of successful trials (it is more
difficult to reach the target within 2 min if one is traveling very
slowly), and latency (if one is traveling quickly, one should be
able to reach the target object in a shorter time). By contrast, pro-
portion of time spent in the target quadrant is independent of
velocity. In general, a shorter path length indicates more efficient
navigation—if an individual knows where they are going they
can travel directly there. However, it is important to note that,
although this measure is independent of velocity, path length is
not necessarily the optimal performance measure because shorter
paths do not necessarily indicate task success (i.e., locating the tar-
get within 2 min). The final measure, cumulative distance to target,
is obtained by sampling the distances from the position of the
participant on the island to the target object, 10 times per second
for the duration of the trial, and summing these values. It pro-
vides an indication of proximity to the target during navigation
(and hence navigational search efficiency). Hence, lower values
indicate better performance.
Data were not analyzed on a trial-by trial basis because
starting-orientation (which varied across trials) influences the
level of difficulty. Thus, for the purpose of data analysis, per-
formance was collapsed across the four visible, and four hidden
trials, respectively. Average scores, rather than total scores, for
each condition were used throughout (to aid comparisons with
previous studies).
EVENT DESCRIPTION (EPISODIC MEMORY/EPISODIC FUTURE
THINKING) TASK
Design and materials
The event description task was modeled on a task developed by
Quon and Atance (2010). It involved asking participants to pro-
vide short, verbal descriptions of particular events. Across three
conditions—past events, future events, and semantic knowledge
conditions—three types of test question phrasing (e.g., what did
you do. . ./what are you going to do. . ./what do you do. . .) were
used to probe (a) episodic memory of specific past events, (b)
episodic simulation of specific future events, and (c) semantic,
script-based knowledge of events of a given type, respectively. We
were careful to select a mixture of frequently occurring and rel-
atively infrequently occurring events for which the accuracy or
likelihood of a child’s response could be easily judged by their par-
ents. The events used included breakfast, evening meal, bedtime,
food shopping, going to the park, having a meal in a restaurant,
Christmas, own birthday, and school trip.
The task was fully counterbalanced across participants to
ensure no systematic bias in terms of (a) which events appeared in
which of the three conditions (e.g., we ensured the event “break-
fast” was used for the past condition for some children, the future
condition for some children, and the semantic condition for some
children), and (b) the order of presentation of events/conditions.
See Supplementary Material for the phrasing used for each event
type in each condition.
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Procedure
Experimental task. The experimenter and child sat opposite one
another in a quiet room in their school or in a laboratory at
Durham University. The experimenter began the task by saying,
“I’m very curious about all the different things you do! So I would
like to ask you some questions about some of the things you do and
some of the places you go to. Okay, let’s start!” Prior to asking about
each event, the experimenter would say, for example, “Let’s talk
about what you eat for breakfast” or “I want to ask you about bed-
time.” She then used the event scenario questions as specified for
the specific versions of the task being used for that child.
If the participant responded with “I don’t know” or did not
respond at all, the experimenter used the following prompt (but
only once): “Let’s think really hard about. . .” and then repeated
the original question. If the child still failed to respond, the exper-
imenter proceeded to next question. If the participant gave a very
general response such as “play,” the experimenter prompted for a
more specific response (e.g., “What did you/do you/are you going
to play?”). If the child failed to elaborate, the experimenter moved
onto the next question. If the participant gave a specific response,
the experimenter gave the one-time prompt, “Anything else?” All
responses were recorded on a solid-state audio recording device.
Accuracy check. Once the child had completed the task, the accu-
racy of their responses was checked with their parents as soon as
possible. These checks were either done in person (for those chil-
dren tested in a university laboratory) or by telephone or email
(for children tested at school). For past and semantic condition
questions, the experimenter provided the child’s response and
asked the parent if it was accurate. For future condition ques-
tions, she asked if it was likely accurate. More specifically, they
were asked to provide responses on a 10-point scale (0 = did not
happen/not likely to happen/completely accurate, 5 = uncertain,
and 10 = definitely happened/will definitely happen/completely
accurate).
For events that do not (by definition) occur on daily or
annual basis (food shopping, park, restaurant, school trip), the
experimenter asked the parent about how frequently the child
experiences the event, to ensure there were not any systematic
differences between the groups in this respect.
Scoring and reliability
All recordings of verbal responses were transcribed by the exper-
imenter. These transcriptions were then coded by the exper-
imenter and a second, blind coder on three dimensions: (1)
whether the child gave a specific (i.e., indicative of episodic fore-
sight/memory) response (response specificity); (2) whether the
child’s response was accurate/likely, according to parent report
(response accuracy); and (3) the proportion of “script indica-
tors” (linguistic markers indicative of semantic knowledge) in the
response (proportion of script indicators). Extraneous aspects of
children’s responses that did not focus on the question were not
coded.
Response specificity. If the child (a) failed to provide a response
(e.g., “I don’t know”), (b) gave an irrelevant or inappropriate
response (e.g., “football” for breakfast event), or gave only a very
broad, generic response (e.g., “everything” or “play” for birth-
day event) after the initial question and follow-up prompt, they
were given a score of 0. If the child gave a specific response (e.g.,
“pizza” for evening meal event), they were assigned a score of
1. An overall response specificity proportion score for each con-
dition was calculated based on the child’s average score across
the three questions in each condition. Inter-rater reliability for
response specificity was high, Cohen’s κ = 0.96.
Response accuracy. Scores of 0 were assigned to (a) responses that
scored 0 on response specificity and (b) responses that parents
judged to be inaccurate. Scores of 1 were assigned to responses
that parents judged to be accurate/likely accurate. For the pur-
pose of data analysis, ratings of 0–4 were deemed “inaccurate”
(scoring 0), ratings of 6–10 were deemed “accurate” (scoring 1),
and ratings of 5 (i.e., the parent was “uncertain”) were excluded
and treated as missing data. An overall response accuracy propor-
tion score for each condition was calculated based on the child’s
average score across the three questions in each condition.
Proportion of script indicators. The first step in calculating the
proportion of script indicators was to identify the number of (a)
script indicators (e.g., generalized present tense verbs; words such
as “usually” and “sometimes”), (b) future temporal indicators
(e.g., future tense verbs; words such as “tomorrow” and “next
time”), and (c) past temporal indicators (e.g., past tense verbs;
words such as “yesterday” and “last time”). See Quon and Atance
(2010) for further detail. An overall script indicator proportion
score for each condition was calculated based on the average
number of script indicators children used across each question,
relative to the total number of script, future temporal and past
temporal indicators they used in that question. Inter-rater relia-
bility for script indicator proportion score was high, Cronbach’s
α = 0.97.
THEORY OF MIND “ANIMATIONS” TASK
As explained in the introduction, ToM was assessed using a
short version of the “animations” task (Abell et al., 2000), which
requires participants to describe interactions between two trian-
gles, as portrayed in a series of silent video clips (see Figure 2 for
an illustration).
For the metalizing condition, we employed the “coaxing” and
“surprising” clips, and for the goal-direct condition, we employed
the “following” and “fighting” clips. According to Abell et al.’s cri-
teria, descriptions were assigned scores of 0, 1, or 2 according to
their level of accuracy. Therefore, within each condition, the max-
imum score was 4 points. Inter-rater reliability for animations
scores was high, Cronbach’s α = 0.96.
RELATIONAL MEMORY TASK
Overview
The relational memory task involved study and yes/no recogni-
tion test phases, which were separated by a filler task (ensuring
that short-term memory could not contribute to experimental
task performance). Stimuli were simple line drawings of objects
(“items”) and patterned backgrounds (“backgrounds”). During
the study phase, children viewed three types of stimuli: (1)
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FIGURE 2 | Five stills taken from one of the animations scripted as
Coaxing (mother and child): (A) Mother tries to interest child in going
outside. (B) Child is reluctant to go out. (C) Mother gently nudges child
toward door. (D) Child explores outside. (E) Mother and child play happily
together. Reprinted from Abell et al. (2000), Copyright Elsevier Science Inc.,
with permission from Elsevier.
isolated items; (2) isolated backgrounds; and (3) combinations
of items and backgrounds. During the test phase, they were pre-
sented with these same stimuli along with lures/distractors, which
also included these three different types of stimuli. Isolated item
and isolated background lures (seen at test only) were completely
“new” (i.e., not seen at study) but combination lures were only
partly “new” (in that the component items and backgrounds had
appeared at study, but not in that combination). This ensured that
participants could not achieve correct responses on combination
stimuli by relying on memory for the item or background alone—
they had to recognize the unique combination (relying specifically
on relational binding).
Materials
In the first instance, a master set of 40 Snodgrass and Vanderwart
(1980) line drawings (“items”) and 40 Microsoft PowerPoint
“backgrounds” was collated. We selected items that we antici-
pated would be visually appealing to children (e.g., rabbit, kite,
carrot). Only relatively simple patterns (e.g., red fabric, crinkly
brown paper, water droplets) were used as backgrounds.
We then created five stimulus subsets, each containing eight
items and eight backgrounds, randomly selected from the mas-
ter set. Using a balanced Latin square, these subsets were used to
create 10 counterbalanced versions of the task. Across these ver-
sions, each subset was rotated across the following trial types:
(1) “isolated trials A” and (2) “isolated trials B”—here, items
and backgrounds were presented individually at study and at test;
(3) “combination trials”—here, items and backgrounds were pre-
sented as part of unique combinations that remained unchanged
across study and test; (4) “combination + combination lure
trials”—here, items and backgrounds were presented as part
of combinations, but they were presented in one combination
at study and a different combination at test; (5) “isolated lure
trials”—here, items and backgrounds were presented individually
at test only (they were not shown at study).
For each version of the task, the stimulus subsets designated
as “isolated A,” “isolated B,” “combination,” and “combination +
lure” were presented in a pseudorandom order during the study
phase (subject to the constraint that no more than three of each
trial type—isolated item, isolated background, combination—
appeared sequentially). During the test phase, “isolated A,” “iso-
lated B,” “combination,” “combination + combination lure”
(with new combinations), and “isolated lure” trials were, again,
presented in a pseudorandom order (subject to the constraint that
no more than three of each trial type appeared in a row). Thus, 48
and 64 stimulus slides were presented during the study and test
phase, respectively. Examples of the stimuli presented during the
study and test phases are shown in Figure 3.
All experimental task stimuli were presented on a laptop
computer using Microsoft PowerPoint software.
Procedure
Training phase. Before commencing the experimental task itself,
participants completed a two-step training task to ensure they
fully understood the task requirements. The materials used for
training were completely different from those used for the exper-
iment itself. At step 1, the experimenter explained that “I’m going
to show you some pictures of things and some backgrounds, and
then I want to test your memory for them.” At this point, she
showed them two isolated items and two isolated backgrounds
sequentially. Then she said, “Now I’d like to see how many of those
pictures and backgrounds you can remember” and showed them
the “old,” previously presented stimulus slides, along with one
“new” (lure), isolated item and one “new,” isolated background
one after another. For each slide, she asked “Did you see that pic-
ture/background just now?” If the child did not score 100% on step
1 of the training task, the experimenter provided feedback and
tested them again with a second set of training materials.
At step 2 of the training task, the experimenter explained
that “Now I’m going to show you some different pictures on
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1411 | 9
Lind et al. Navigation, memory, ToM and autism
FIGURE 3 | Examples of stimuli presented during the relational memory
task. At study, participants were presented with three type of stimuli: isolated
items (simple line drawings); isolated backgrounds (patterned backgrounds);
and combinations of items superimposed on backgrounds. At test,
participants were presented with previously studied stimuli (targets) as well as
distractor stimuli (lures), and asked to make old/new recognition judgments.
different backgrounds and see whether you can remember which
pictures belong on which backgrounds” and showed the child
three item-background combinations sequentially, in each case
saying, “See, that’s where the [item] belongs.” Then she showed
them one of the original item-background combinations and two
new combinations, based on the remaining two old combina-
tions, one after another. For each one, she asked, “Did you see
that picture on that background just now? Is that where the [item]
belongs?” As for step 1, if a child failed to score 100% on step
2, the experimenter provided feedback, and tested them again
with a second set of training materials. Any child who could not
achieve 100% on step 1 or 2 of the training phase would have
been excluded from the experiment but no child fell into this
category.
Study phase. Having successfully completed the training phase,
participants progressed onto the experimental task. At this point,
the experimenter explained that “Now I’m going to show you lots
more pictures and backgrounds and later on I’m going to see how
many of them you can remember. Sometimes I’ll show you pictures
on their own, sometimes backgrounds on their own, and sometimes
I’ll show you pictures on backgrounds. For those ones, it’s important
to try to remember which background the picture belonged on.” Each
child was assigned to one of the 10 counterbalanced versions of
the task and viewed the corresponding set of study phase stimulus
slides. Each of the slides appeared on screen for 4 s. During each
1-s inter-stimulus interval, a plain white slide with a fixation-cross
appeared.
Filler task. The filler task was completed immediately after the
study phase. The materials consisted of 15 slides presented on
Microsoft PowerPoint, each containing two large circles. The cir-
cles were colored red, green, or blue and the child’s task was to say
on which side (left/right) the green circle appeared on each slide.
Including time taken to explain the filler task and the time taken
to explain the test phase of the experimental task, the interval
between study and test was 3–4 min.
Yes/no recognition test phase. After the filler task, the
experimenter said, “Now I’d like to see how many pictures
and backgrounds you can remember from earlier” and showed the
participant the test phase stimulus slides and lure slides, in each
case asking, “Did you see that picture/background earlier?” or “Did
you see that picture on that background just now? Is that where
the [item] belongs?” when appropriate (isolated items, isolated
backgrounds, and combinations were interspersed). The slides
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were again presented using PowerPoint but no timings were used.
Once the child has responded “yes” or “no” to a particular slide,
the experimenter moved onto the next slide manually (i.e., this
phase was self-paced). Responses were recorded manually using a
pen and scoring sheet.
Dependent measures and scoring. The key dependent measures
on the task were, hit rates (proportions of studied items/
backgrounds/combinations correctly identified as “old”), false
alarm rates (proportion of lure items/backgrounds/combinations
incorrectly identified as “old”), and corrected hit rates (hit
rate minus false alarm rate) across the item, background, and
combination conditions.
CENTRAL COHERENCE TASK—SEGMENTED vs. UNSEGMENTED BLOCK
DESIGN
Materials and procedure
The unsegmented version of the block design task was adminis-
tered and scored, according to standard instructions, as part of the
WASI. To ensure consistency between the unsegmented and seg-
mented versions, rather than using the stimulus booklet itself, the
designs were reproduced exactly as they appear in the WASI stim-
ulus booklet on separate pieces of paper measuring approximately
20 cm by 21 cm. Each 2D “block” was reproduced to appear
3.9 cm by 3.9 cm and each design was laminated. The block design
patterns for the segmented version were reproduced precisely
from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fourth UK
Edition (WISC-IV UK; Wechsler, 2004). For this task, the designs
were also reproduced on separate 20 cm by 21 cm pieces of lami-
nated paper with 2D squares of 3.9 cm by 3.9 cm in size. This time,
however, each 2D block was separated by 1.7 cm of white space,
effectively segmenting the designs into their individual blocks. See
Figure 4 for an illustration of the task.
Scoring
To obtain a metric of central coherence, difference scores were
created by subtracting unsegmented raw scores from segmented
raw scores. Thus, higher difference scores indicate stronger cen-
tral coherence because they imply the participant benefited to a
greater extent from the manipulation to the stimuli.
DATA ANALYSIS
A standard alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical sig-
nificance. All reported significance values are for two-tailed tests
(except those associated with correlation analyses or t-tests, where
directional hypotheses were made). We report r values as mea-
sures of effect size for continuous variables and Cramer’s V for
categorical variables (≥0.10 = small, ≥0.30 = moderate, ≥0.50 =
large; Cohen, 1969).
RESULTS
SPATIAL NAVIGATION TASK
A series of six 2 (Group: ASD, comparison) × 2 (Condition: vis-
ible, hidden) mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted to explore
differences in (a) proportion of time in the target quadrant, (b)
latency, (c) proportion of successful trials, (d) velocity, (e) path
length, and (f) cumulative distance to target, respectively. The
results of these analyses and full descriptive statistics are reported
in Table 2.
These ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of Group on
latency, proportion of successful trials, path length, and cumula-
tive distance (or proximity of search area) to target (each associ-
ated with moderate effect sizes), but not on proportion of time
in the target quadrant, or velocity (each associated with small
effect sizes). These results reflect the fact that the ASD group took
longer overall to find the targets, successfully completed fewer tri-
als, took longer routes, and covered a broader search area than
FIGURE 4 | Examples of segmented and (standard) unsegmented block
design patterns used to assess central coherence. Participants were asked
to recreate the 2D patterns using 3D colored blocks, each with two red sides,
two white sides, and two half red-half white sides. Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence. Copyright © 1999 NCS Pearson, Inc. Reproduced with
permission. All rights reserved. “Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence”
and “WASI” are trademarks, in the US and/or other countries, of Pearson
Education, Inc. or its affiliates(s).
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Table 2 | Descriptive (means and standard deviations) and inferential (Group [ASD, comparison] × Condition [visible, hidden] mixed-design
ANOVA) statistics for spatial navigation dependent measures.
Dependent measure Condition Descriptive statistics Inferential statistics
Group Condition Group × condition
ASD Comparison Total F (1, 37) p r F (1, 37) p r F (1, 37) p r
(n = 19) (n = 20)
Proportion of time Visible 0.91 (0.04) 0.89 (0.07) 0.90 (0.05)
in target quadrant Hidden 0.79 (0.17) 0.85 (0.08) 0.82 (0.13)
Total 0.85 (0.13) 0.87 (0.08) 0.86 (0.11)
0.61 0.439 0.13 16.16 <0.001 0.55 3.72 0.062 0.30
Latency to reach Visible 66.12 (13.94) 60.24 (7.52) 63.10 (11.37)
target (seconds) Hidden 87.33 (26.49) 68.15 (10.83) 77.50 (22.03)
Total 76.73 (23.49) 64.20 (10.04) 70.30 (18.86)
7.61 0.009 0.41 33.62 <0.001 0.69 7.01 0.012 0.40
Proportion of Visible 0.99 (0.06) 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.04)
successful trials Hidden 0.86 (0.19) 0.96 (0.09) 0.91 (0.16)
Total 0.92 (0.15) 0.98 (0.06) 0.95 (0.12)
5.59 0.023 0.36 12.41 0.001 0.50 3.84 0.058 0.31
Velocity Visible 7.07 (1.05) 7.51 (0.70) 7.30 (0.90)
(virtual units/second) Hidden 7.60 (1.00) 8.02 (0.68) 7.82 (0.87)
Total 7.33 (1.05) 7.77 (0.73) 7.56 (0.92)
2.80 0.103 0.27 27.17 <0.001 0.65 0.01 0.92 0.02
Path length Visible 443.65 (23.32) 438.72 (34.51) 441.12 (29.31)
(virtual units) Hidden 634.33 (167.05) 537.28 (79.26) 584.56 (137.02)
Total 538.99 (152.23) 488.00 (78.31) 512.84 (122.07)
4.56 0.039 0.33 61.98 <0.001 0.79 6.29 0.017 0.38
Cumulative distance to Visible 30989 (7933) 28349 (4186) 29635 (6353)
target Hidden 46373 (20316) 33307 (7673) 39672 (16392)
(virtual units) Total 38681 (17093) 30828 (6597) 34654 (13343)
7.16 0.011 0.40 19.61 <0.001 0.59 5.15 0.029 0.35
Values in bold are significant at the p < 0.05 level.
the comparison group. There were also significant main effects
of Condition on all of the five dependent variables (each asso-
ciated with moderate to large effect sizes). These results reflect
the fact that in the hidden trials, participants spent a smaller pro-
portion of time in the target quadrant, took longer to find the
targets, successfully completed fewer trials, traveled more quickly,
took significantly longer routes, and covered a broader search area
compared to the visible trials (see Figure 5 for heat maps of the
best and worse performing participants in hidden trial 1).
Most relevant to our predictions, significant or marginally sig-
nificant interaction effects between Group and Condition were
found for all variables (each associated with moderate effect
sizes), except for velocity (associated with a negligible effect size).
Inspection of the descriptive statistics (see Table 2) suggests the
significant or marginally significant interaction effect on propor-
tion of time spent in the target quadrant was driven by the fact
that the ASD group performed better than the comparison group
in the visible condition (r = 0.17), but performed less well in the
hidden condition (r = 0.22). The significant interaction effect on
latency seems to be driven by the fact that the ASD group showed
only slightly longer latencies than the comparison group in the
visible condition (r = 0.25) but substantially longer latencies in
the hidden condition (r = 0.43). The marginally significant inter-
action effect on proportion of successful trials is likely to be
explained by the fact that both groups performed at, or close to,
ceiling in the visible condition (r = 0.12), but the ASD group suc-
cessfully completed substantially fewer trials than the comparison
group in the hidden condition (r = 0.32). The significant inter-
action effect on path length appears to be due to the fact that
the groups showed very similar path lengths in the visible condi-
tion (r = 0.08) but the ASD group took substantially longer paths
than the comparison group in the hidden condition (r = 0.35).
Finally, the significant interaction effect on cumulative distance to
target appears to be explained by the fact that group differences
were larger in the hidden condition (r = 0.39) than the visible
condition (r = 0.20).
EVENT DESCRIPTION (EPISODIC MEMORY/EPISODIC FUTURE
THINKING) TASK
Before analyzing the main experimental results from the event
description task, preliminary analyses were carried out to ensure
there were no systematic group differences in how frequently the
children experienced the events they were asked about, according
to parent report. The frequency data are reported in Table 3.
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FIGURE 5 | Illustrations of performance on hidden trial 1 of the
Memory Island navigation task. As shown in (A), participants started
the trial in the center of the island (and center-point of the figure)
and had to find their way to the target, which is positioned at the
bottom right of the figure. (B,C) are heat maps illustrating the routes
taken by the best (C) and worst (B) performing participants. In (B),
the participant starts off in the opposite direction to the target and
has to double-back on himself to eventually find it. In (C), the
participant takes a moment to correctly orient himself and then travels
directly to the target.
Table 3 | Frequency at which children in each of the groups experienced each event type according to parental report.
Event Group Frequency of experiencing
Almost At least At least At least At least At least At least Less than Never
daily weekly fortnightly monthly every 3 months every 6 months annually annually
Food shopping ASD 0 8 5 5 0 1 0 0 1
Comparison 0 7 4 6 0 0 0 1 0
Park ASD 0 7 5 6 0 0 0 2 0
Comparison 2 8 3 4 1 0 0 0 0
Restaurant ASD 0 2 6 11 0 0 0 0 1
Comparison 0 2 7 6 2 1 0 0 0
School trip ASD 0 0 0 1 0 19 0 0 0
Comparison 0 0 0 0 0 17 1 0 0
Chi-square analyses revealed no significant differences in how
frequently children in each group experienced food shopping
trips, trips to the park, meals at restaurants, or school trips,
all χ2s(5,N = 38) = 5.88, ps = 0.318, all Vs = 0.39. Thus, any
observed group differences in experimental task performance
cannot be attributed to group differences in frequency of relevant
experiences.
The three main dependent measures on the event descrip-
tion task were response specificity, response accuracy, and pro-
portion of script indicators. A series of three 2 (Group: ASD,
comparison) × 3 (Condition: past, future, semantic) mixed-
design ANOVAs were conducted to explore differences in each of
these variables. The results of these analyses and full descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4 | Descriptive (means and standard deviations) and inferential (Group [ASD, comparison] × Condition [past, future, script] mixed-design
ANOVA) statistics for the event description (episodic memory/episodic future thinking) task.
Dependent Condition Descriptive statistics Inferential statistics
measure
Group Condition Group × condition
ASD Comparison Total F df p r F df p r F df p r
Response Past 0.88 (0.20) 0.98 (0.07) 0.93 (0.15)
specificity Future 0.87 (0.27) 0.93 (0.14) 0.90 (0.22)
Script 0.92 (0.21) 0.97 (0.10) 0.94 (0.17)
Total 0.89 (0.23) 0.96 (0.11) 0.93 (0.18)
3.06 1,38 0.089 0.27 0.86 2,76 0.429 0.11 0.29 2,76 0.753 0.06
Response Past 0.88 (0.20) 0.98 (0.08) 0.93 (0.16)
accuracy Future 0.83 (0.28) 0.94 (0.13) 0.89 (0.22)
Script 0.90 (0.22) 0.98 (0.08) 0.94 (0.17)
Total 0.87 (0.23) 0.97 (0.10) 0.92 (0.19)
4.79 1,36 0.035 0.34 1.35 2,72 0.265 0.14 0.10 2,72 0.908 0.04
Proportion of Past 0.08 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13)
script indicators Future 0.32 (0.23) 0.36 (0.18) 0.34 (0.21)
Script 0.66 (0.24) 0.61 (0.25) 0.64 (0.25)
Total 0.35 (0.32) 0.35 (0.29) 0.35 (0.30)
0.04 1,38 0.840 0.03 73.79 2,76 <0.001 0.70 0.52 2,72 0.597 0.08
Values in bold are significant at the p < 0.05 level.
These analyses revealed a marginally significantly main effect
of group on response specificity (associated with a small effect
size; reflecting greater specificity among the comparison group),
a significant effect of group on response accuracy (associated
with a moderate effect size; reflecting higher accuracy among the
comparison group), and a non-significant effect of group on pro-
portion of script indicators (associated with a negligible effect
size). It is important to note that larger underlying group differ-
ences in response specificity and response accuracy may have been
masked by the near-ceiling level performance of the comparison
group.
Non-significant main effects of condition were observed for
response specificity and response accuracy (associated with small
effect sizes), but a clear effect of condition was observed for pro-
portion of script indicators (associated with a large effect size).
This reflects the very low proportion of script indicators used
in the past condition, the higher proportion used in the future
condition, and the very high proportion used in the semantic
condition. No significant interaction effects between group and
condition were observed for any of the three dependent variables
(each associated with negligible effect sizes).
THEORY OF MIND (ANIMATIONS) TASK
Animations task performance was analyzed using a 2 (Group:
ASD, comparison) × 2 (Condition: metalizing, goal-directed)
mixed-design ANOVA. This revealed (contrary to expectations) a
non-significant main effect of Group, F(1, 38) = 0.11, p = 0.747,
r = 0.05, and a non-significant interaction effect between Group
and Condition, F(1, 38) = 0.33, p = 0.570, r = 0.09, reflecting
similar levels of performance among the groups in both the
goal-directed (ASD: M = 3.00, SD = 0.79; comparison: M =
3.05, SD = 0.94) and metalizing conditions (ASD: M = 1.05,
SD = 1.19; comparison: M = 0.85, SD = 1.04). There was, how-
ever, a strong and significant main effect of condition, F(1, 38) =
90.71, p < 0.001, r = 0.84, reflecting better performance in the
goal-directed than metalizing condition.
RELATIONAL MEMORY TASK
A series of three 2 (Group: ASD, comparison) × 3 (Condition:
item, background, combination) mixed-design ANOVAs were
conducted to explore differences in hit rate, false alarm rate, and
corrected hit rate, respectively. The results of these analyses and
full descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.
Each of these analyses revealed non-significant main effects
of Group (associated with negligible to small effect sizes), sig-
nificant main effects of Condition (associated with moderate
to large effect sizes), and non-significant interactions between
Group and Condition (associated with negligible to small effect
sizes). The significant main effects of Condition across all three
dependent measures reflect the fact that, in line with expecta-
tions, recognition memory was substantially better in the iso-
lated item and background conditions than in the combination
condition.
SEGMENTED vs. UNSEGMENTED BLOCK DESIGN (CENTRAL
COHERENCE) TASK
The mean (SD) unsegmented block design raw scores for the ASD
and comparison groups were 24.22 (16.22) and 27.55 (12.34),
respectively. The mean (SD) segmented scores were 43.50 (18.71)
and 53.15 (7.91), respectively. Consistent with the theory of weak
central coherence (Happé and Frith, 2006), participants with ASD
obtained lower segmented/unsegmented block design difference
scores (M = 19.28, SD = 12.40) than comparison participants
(M = 25.60, SD = 11.26). In other words, they were less affected
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Table 5 | Descriptive (means and standard deviations) and inferential (Group [ASD, comparison] × Condition [item, background, combination]
mixed-design ANOVA) statistics for relational memory task dependent measures.
Dependent Condition Descriptive statistics Inferential statistics
measure
Group Condition Group × condition
ASD Comparison Total F (1, 38) p r F (2, 76) p r F (2, 76) p r
Hit rate Item 0.74 (0.21) 0.81 (0.17) 0.78 (0.19)
Background 0.68 (0.21) 0.76 (0.14) 0.72 (0.18)
Combination 0.57 (0.28) 0.67 (0.23) 0.62 (0.26)
Total 0.67 (0.24) 0.75 (0.19) 0.71 (0.22)
2.61 0.114 0.25 9.54 <0.001 0.33 0.08 0.923 0.10
False alarm rate Item 0.10 (0.23) 0.04 (0.10) 0.07 (0.18)
Background 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07)
Combination 0.34 (0.21) 0.41 (0.25) 0.37 (0.23)
Total 0.15 (0.23) 0.16 (0.24) 0.16 (0.23)
0.05 0.822 0.04 54.21 <0.001 0.70 1.53 0.227 0.16
Corrected hit rate Item 0.64 (0.28) 0.77 (0.20) 0.70 (0.25)
Background 0.66 (0.24) 0.73 (0.15) 0.69 (0.21)
Combination 0.23 (0.24) 0.26 (0.23) 0.25 (0.24)
Total 0.51 (0.32) 0.59 (0.30) 0.55 (0.31) 2.12 0.154 0.23 68.54 <0.001 0.69 0.61 0.547 0.09
Values in bold are significant at the p < 0.05 level.
by the manipulation to the patterns than comparison partici-
pants (consistent with the idea that they already see the designs in
terms of their component parts). An independent samples t-test
indicated that this small difference was marginally statistically
significant, t(36) = 1.65, p = 0.054, r = 0.26.
RELATIONS BETWEEN TASKS
Finally, we analyzed the correlations among each of the main
dependent variables and the measures of ASD features, within
each group separately. For the purpose of these correlations,
the following variables were used: SRS-2 raw score (measure
of ASD features); RBS-R total score (measure of behavioral
inflexibility); cumulative distance to target in the hidden condi-
tion (measure of memory guided spatial navigation); corrected
hit rate in the combination condition (measure of relational
memory); response accuracy in the past condition (measure of
episodic memory); response accuracy in the future condition
(measure of episodic future thinking); response accuracy in the
semantic script knowledge condition (measure of semantic event
knowledge); combined goal-directed and metalizing score (mea-
sure of ToM); segmented/unsegmented block design difference
score (measure of central coherence). The results are displayed in
a correlation matrix (see Table 6).
Notably, the predicted positive relations among spatial nav-
igation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM
were not supported by the analyses, with non-significant results
observed in each case. Within the ASD group, significant
moderate-to-strong correlations were observed between (a) spa-
tial navigation and behavioral inflexibility (negative relation; as
predicted), (b) spatial navigation and relational memory (nega-
tive relation; contrary to predictions), (c) episodic memory and
semantic event knowledge (positive relation; as expected), and (d)
episodic future thinking and semantic event knowledge (positive
relation; as expected). Within the comparison group, there was an
unexpected significant, moderate, negative correlation between
relational memory and behavioral inflexibility. None of the other
correlations reached statistical significance.
DISCUSSION
Our first prediction that spatial navigation would be impaired
among children with ASD was clearly supported by the data.
Significant or marginally significant group (ASD/comparison) by
condition (visible/hidden) interaction effects were observed for
all of the dependent variables, apart from velocity, which is not
itself regarded as a performance measure. This reflects the fact
that children with ASD had difficulties with the task that were
specific to the hidden condition, which unlike the visible con-
dition, relied on memory guided navigation. The ASD group
spent a smaller proportion of time in the target quadrant, took
longer to find the targets, successfully completed fewer trials,
took significantly longer routes, and covered a broader search
area, compared to the typically developing group. This is only the
second published study to directly demonstrate impairments in
survey-based/cognitive-map-based navigation among individuals
with ASD, relative to age, sex, and IQ matched typically develop-
ing individuals, and the first study to show it in children with the
disorder (although impairments in other forms of spatial memory
have been demonstrated in this population; Pellicano et al., 2011).
The current findings are broadly in line with our previous find-
ings from a sample of intellectually high-functioning adults with
ASD (Lind et al., 2013). Together, these studies suggest that spatial
navigation impairments are relatively early to emerge in develop-
ment and are long-standing, persisting into adulthood (of course,
longitudinal research, and research with other paradigms would
be needed to conclude this with greater certainty). However,
it is notable that both the ASD and typically developing child
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Table 6 | Correlations among the main dependent variables and measures of ASD features: r-values for the ASD group with r-values for
comparison group shown in parentheses.
Navigation Relational Episodic Episodic Semantic ToM Central
memory memory future thinking event knowledge coherence i
SRS-2 a −0.37 (0.34) −0.17 (−0.16) 0.16 (0.19) 0.26 (−0.29) 0.35 (−0.39) 0.27 (0.06) <0.01 (0.12)
RBS-R b −0.48* (0.15) 0.10 (−0.39*) 0.28 (0.17) 0.07 (−0.20) 0.33 (0.17) 0.24 (−0.37) 0.07 (−0.12)
Navigation c −0.49* (0.23) 0.07 (−0.17) 0.09 (−0.27) 0.10 (−0.06) −0.12 (0.09) −0.10 (0.06)
Relational memory d >0.01 (−0.11) −0.02 (0.34) −0.28 (−0.11) −0.23 (0.35) −0.19 (0.09)
Episodic memory e 0.27 (−0.11) 0.53* (−0.06) 0.15 (−0.18) 0.21 (0.26)
Episodic future thinking f 0.48* (0.11) 0.02 (0.26) −0.31 (−0.38)
Semantic event knowledgeg 0.13 (−0.02) 0.21 (−0.28)
ToM h −0.09 (−02)
RBS-R, Repetitive behavior scale; SRS-2, Social Responsiveness Scale – Second Edition; ToM, theory of mind.
*Significant at the p < 0.05 level;
a Raw score;
b Total score;
c Cumulative distance to target in the hidden condition;
d Corrected hit rate in the combination condition;
e Response accuracy in the past condition;
f Response accuracy in the future condition;
g Response accuracy in the semantic script knowledge condition;
h Combined goal-directed and metalizing score;
i Segmented/unsegmented block design difference score.
Values in bold are significant at the p < 0.05 level.
groups employed in the current study performed notably better
on the navigation task (which was identical) than did their adult
counterparts (with similar IQs) employed in our previous study.
Although we cannot be certain of the reason for this finding, one
possibility is that children are more familiar with and proficient
in navigating around computer-simulated environments because
they have more experience with computer games. Overall though,
these findings are consistent with our core hypothesis that self-
projection/scene construction/mental simulation is diminished
in ASD.
We also predicted that children with ASD would show
impaired episodic memory and episodic future thinking in the
event description task. There was a marginally significant dif-
ference between the groups in terms of response specificity but,
more importantly, the ASD group showed a significant disadvan-
tage on the key dependent measure, response accuracy, regardless
of condition. Thus, children with ASD not only had more dif-
ficulty generating specific responses but also appeared to be
confabulating past experiences and imagining implausible future
experiences to a greater extent than typically developing chil-
dren. This is an important and striking finding since few studies
of memory, and none of episodic future thinking, in ASD have
explored accuracy—the majority have assessed the level of detail
(e.g., Lind et al., 2014) or response specificity (e.g., Crane and
Goddard, 2008; Lind and Bowler, 2010) of verbal reports of
events.
A notable exception is a study of autobiographical memory by
Bruck et al. (2007), in which children with and without ASD were
asked to recall life events (with accuracy of reports being estab-
lished through parental report). They found that children with
ASD produced significantly fewer event recall utterances that were
confirmed by their parents, indicating reduced levels of episodic
remembering. However, in general, children with ASD did not
produce significantly more utterances that were “unconfirmed”
by or “inconsistent” with parental report. This led Bruck et al. to
conclude that children with ASD were no more likely than chil-
dren without ASD to produce confabulated memories. However,
in each past event narrative, children with ASD produced fewer
utterances per se than children without ASD. Now, it is arguable
that, for the purposes of judging the extent to which children with
ASD confabulate, the most informative analysis would have been
to explore the proportion of unconfirmed/inconsistent responses
produced by participants within each group. A larger proportion
of such responses by children with ASD would indicate a greater
tendency to confabulate. To resolve this issue, we explored Bruck
et al.’s (2007) participant responses to “specific” questions (which
made up the majority of their interview) about each life event (see
their Tables 2–5). Collapsing their data across age groups, we cal-
culated the proportion of utterances made by participants from
each diagnostic group that were inconsistent or unconfirmed.
According to our calculations, across all four event-narratives, the
proportion of such utterances was 0.53 (SD = 0.52) for the ASD
group and 0.27 (SD = 0.46) for the comparison group. In this
respect, the difference between the groups was statistically signifi-
cant, with a moderate effect size, t(64) = 2.71, p = 0.03, d = 0.54.
Contrary to Bruck et al.’s (2007) conclusions, therefore, a sub-
stantial proportion of utterances made by participants with ASD
about their previous life events could not be confirmed, suggest-
ing significant confabulation. The results of the current study are
consistent with this reanalysis of Bruck et al.’s data.
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As explained in the introduction, Terrett et al. (2013) explored
episodic memory and episodic future thinking among children
with ASD. Their method was similar to the current method but
the coding of responses was quite different. Terrett et al. coded
responses according to number of details generated. Hence, we
cannot establish whether their participants’ verbal responses were
based on accurate memory for the past or likely accurate episodic
future thinking of the future. Only the current study has explored
this. Nevertheless, together these studies suggest that episodic
memory and episodic future thinking are impaired in children
with ASD. The fact that impairments in these abilities have been
observed in both children and adults, across different studies,
suggests that, like navigation impairments, these difficulties are
both early emerging and persistent through development.
The results did not support our prediction that ToM would be
impaired among children with ASD—in fact, participants with
ASD performed slightly better than typically developing children
in the metalizing condition of the animations task. This was an
unexpected but, by no means, unprecedented finding (e.g., Salter
et al., 2008). This result may be at least partly explained by the fact
that both groups found the task quite challenging. For instance,
the mean accuracy score for the typically developing compari-
son group on the metalizing condition was just 21%. This is far
lower than the mean obtained in Abell et al.’s (2000) original typ-
ically developing sample, who scored approximately 59%, despite
the fact that participants from each study were of a similar mean
age and ability level (Abell et al.’s study: mean CA = 8.5 years;
mean FSIQ = 97; current study: mean CA = 8.32; mean FSIQ =
109). Thus, a trend toward floor effects in the metalizing con-
dition may potentially have masked latent group differences in
ToM in the current study. One notable difference between the
current study and Abell et al.’s study is that we used two rather
than four clips for each condition. Although this could potentially
explain the discrepant findings, Abell et al.’s item analysis sug-
gested that all clips within each condition were of an equivalent
level of difficulty, so it seems unlikely that we had inadvertently
selected the more difficult clips for the current study. Regardless
of the reason for the current pattern of results, it is clear that these
ToM findings do not provide any positive evidence for the sug-
gestion that self-projection or inter-personal mental simulation
are impaired in ASD. This stands in contrast to the majority of
published research on ToM in ASD, which shows reliable impair-
ments (and is in keeping with the hypothesis of impairments in
self-projection and/or mental stimulation).
The results also failed to support our prediction of impaired
relational memory in ASD—children with ASD not only showed
recognition memory for individual items or backgrounds that
was equivalent to sex, age, and IQ matched typically developing
children (confirming previous research; e.g., Lind and Bowler,
2009; see Boucher et al., 2012, for a review), but also equivalent
recognition memory for combinations of items and backgrounds.
This suggests that, contrary to predictions; relational memory
for pairs of elements is intact in children with ASD. This find-
ing is unlikely to be due to lack of statistical power, given that
our sample size exceeded that needed to obtain the recommended
level of statistical power required to detect a genuine group dif-
ference if present (0.80; Cohen, 1992). Moreover, the effect sizes
associated with group differences in recognition memory mea-
sures in the combination condition were all small in magnitude
(and had high associated p-values). The current findings stand in
contrast to those of Bowler et al. (2014), who observed a signifi-
cant diminution in relational memory among adults with ASD. It
is worth considering the possibility that although relational mem-
ory problems may not affect children with ASD, they may emerge
as a developmental consequence of having ASD (see Karmiloff-
Smith, 1997). However, arguably, a more plausible explanation
for the discrepancies in results across these studies lies in the spe-
cific task demands of the experimental procedures employed in
each of these studies, respectively. It is notable that the current
results are consistent with the “task support hypothesis” (e.g.,
Bowler et al., 2004), which suggests that memory performance in
ASD is facilitated when external “support” is provided at retrieval.
Hence, (supported) tests of recognition memory or cued recall
are considerably easier than (unsupported) tests of free recall for
individuals with ASD. The current results show that children with
ASD are able to encode the relations between pairs of features,
and retrieve those relations in a highly supported recognition
memory test. However, it remains a possibility that those suc-
cessfully encoded relations may not be so readily retrieved if less
support were provided at test (e.g., memory was tested using a
free recall procedure). But even if this is true, this cannot be the
complete explanation for the current null findings, since Bowler
et al. also used a (supported) recognition memory procedure.
It is also possible that although binding of simple binary rela-
tions in ASD (as assessed in Bowler et al., 2014 and the current
study) is not reliably impaired, more complex multi-feature (and
potentially multi-modal) forms of binding (required for spatial
navigation, episodic memory, and episodic future thinking) are in
fact impaired. This is something that could be explored in future
studies.
The final prediction we made, in terms of between-group
performance differences (although not of central interest to the
study), was that typically developing children would show greater
central coherence, as quantified by the difference in performance
between segmented and unsegmented versions of block design.
This prediction was broadly confirmed with a marginally signifi-
cant group difference in the expected direction.
In addition to exploring the basic between-group differences
in performance on the main experimental tasks, we also set out
to investigate the relations between these tasks and quantita-
tive differences in levels of ASD traits in general, and behavioral
inflexibility in particular. The first thing to note, with respect to
these analyses, is that results should be interpreted with caution,
given the relatively small sample employed. The majority of the
predicted, negative correlations failed to emerge (potentially due
to limited statistical power). However, within the ASD group a
moderate-to-strong and significant negative correlation between
scores on the RBS-R (which measures behavioral inflexibility) and
navigation performance did emerge. Thus, high levels of inflexi-
ble behavior were associated with poorer navigation. Within the
comparison group, there was a moderate and significant nega-
tive correlation between RBS-R scores and relational memory.
However, this latter finding is likely to be a statistical anomaly
given that RBS-R scores showed very little variation in this group.
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We also explored the relations between each of the tasks that we
hypothesized relied on self-projection/scene construction/mental
simulation (or some other common cognitive ability such as cen-
tral coherence or relational memory). Again, very few of the pre-
dicted results emerged in the data. Indeed, we observed one result
that was completely opposite to what we had expected—within
the ASD group, relational memory was moderately-to-strongly
and significantly negatively correlated with navigation perfor-
mance. Notably, the current study failed to replicate our previous
finding that spatial navigation was significantly, positively related
to episodic memory and ToM in adults with ASD (Lind et al.,
2013).
A further surprising finding was that our measures of episodic
memory and episodic future thinking were significantly corre-
lated with semantic event knowledge within the ASD group only.
Given that both episodic memory and episodic future thinking
are thought to rely to some extent on support from the seman-
tic memory system (general event knowledge or “scripts” stored
in semantic memory are thought to provide the foundations
for episodic retrieval and simulation; e.g., Hudson and Mayhew,
2009; Martin-Ordas et al., 2014), one would have expected to see
at least small positive relations within both groups. One possible
interpretation is that the current findings reflect an over-reliance
on semantic event knowledge among children with ASD, rela-
tive to their typically developing counterparts. This may poten-
tially imply that children with ASD were engaging in something
more akin to semantic memory based event recall and “semantic
future thinking” (Atance and O’Neill, 2005), rather than genuine
episodic memory and episodic future thinking (i.e., true “mental
time travel”; Wheeler et al., 1997) when completing the past and
future events conditions of the task.
In terms of the clinical implications of the current findings,
impairments in navigation, episodic memory, and episodic future
thinking could potentially have significant consequences for peo-
ple with ASD. In particular, they suggest that people with the
disorder may be more prone to getting lost in their daily lives
and have difficulty anticipating future events (which would make
planning particularly challenging). With respect to navigation, in
particular, it might be possible to develop intervention strategies
to improve the skills of individuals with ASD. Relevant to this,
we were recently contacted by the mother of a teenage boy with
ASD (and accompanying moderate learning disability), who had
seen our previous study of navigation among adults with ASD
(Lind et al., 2013). She was particularly interested in the findings
because they stood in stark contrast to her son’s exceptional spa-
tial navigation skills. She described in detail how from an early
age he has been able to help the rest of the family find their
way around in different environments—urban and rural—and
how he always remembers where they have parked the car! She
explained that once he has visited a place once, it appears to be
imprinted in his memory—he can guide you back to it even when
years have elapsed. Perhaps the key to this young man’s impressive
abilities is that he has a special interest in all things navigation-
related (maps, Google Earth etc.) and has developed his own
strategies for learning the topographical layout of the places he
visits—e.g., finding an elevated position and looking down on his
surroundings. This individual case highlights the possible utility
of developing intervention strategies that may enhance the nav-
igation skills of individuals with ASD who have difficulties in
this domain. This is something that we hope to explore in future
research.
In sum, the finding of concurrent impairments in spatial
navigation, episodic memory, and episodic future thinking in
children with ASD is consistent with our hypothesis that self-
projection/scene construction/mental simulation is impaired in
ASD (although we acknowledge that other interpretations are
possible). Certainly, postulating impairment in one of these
putative underlying cognitive processes provides a parsimonious
explanation for the results. Difficulties with mentally re-
experiencing or pre-experiencing past or future events in the
event description task, and with generating a cognitive map of the
memory island environment could well be explained by a more
fundamental problem with mentally simulating alternative spatial
or temporal perspectives (i.e., self-projection) or with generat-
ing and maintaining a complex and coherent scene in mind (i.e.,
scene construction). In other words, children (and adults) with
ASD may have difficulties with the representational processes
required for mental simulation. We hope that the current study
will pave the way for larger-scale, future research to explore the
relations between these abilities using a cognitive-experimental
approach, rather than merely a neuro-scientific one.
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